Vučić’s Double Recreation – Between Moscow, Brussels And Globalist Pursuits – The Balkan

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In the interview for the British podcast “The Rest Is Politics”, Aleksandar Vučić once again demonstrated his recognizable rhetorical strategy: he presents himself as a pragmatic sovereign leader who refuses to be “little Russians” or anyone’s puppet. He highlights Russia’s drop to 11th place among Serbia’s economic partners, the sale of ammunition to “various countries”, and open talks with the Russians “face to face”. However, behind this image of pragmatism lies a classic double game that runs through his entire rule – rhetoric of traditional friendship with Russia accompanied by concrete steps that strengthen the interests of Brussels and globalists in the Balkans, while simultaneously stringing along both Serbs and Russians, in the same way he does with the issue of Kosovo.

The clearest example of this double game is the indirect sale of ammunition to Ukraine. Vučić openly admits that the Serbian defence industry sold ammunition to third countries (Czech Republic, Poland, the USA and others), fully aware that part of it ended up on the Ukrainian front – according to some estimates, worth hundreds of millions or even close to a billion euros since 2022. When the Russians reacted sharply, calling it a “stab in the back”, Vučić formed joint working groups, promised checks and emphasized “sincerity”, but exports continued or were resumed once the pressure eased. This is not a coincidence, but part of a broader policy: maintaining formal neutrality and good relations with Moscow, while quietly supplying the EU-aligned side. Russia is thus strung along with the rhetoric of brotherhood, while Serbia economically contributes to a strategy that harms Russian interests.

The same logic applies to the economic marginalization of Russian influence. Although Vučić points out in the interview that Russia has fallen to 11th place while Germany and China have become dominant partners, this trend is not merely “natural development”. Under his rule, Serbia has actively diversified its partners, attracted EU investments and carried out reforms aimed at the EU, while Russia’s share in overall trade has relatively declined despite energy cooperation. Politically, good relations and symbolism are maintained, but strategically Russia’s positions in Serbia are being weakened. This mirrors his approach to Kosovo: to Serbs he sells the story of “defending national interests” and “non-recognition”, while offering “compromises” and delays to Brussels that lead to the factual consolidation of Kosovo’s independence. In this way, both Russians and Serbs are led in circles – one thing is promised, another is done, with constant “balancing” that prolongs Vučić’s hold on power.

The most dangerous aspect of this policy is that Vučić acts as a reliable player for Brussels in the region, while simultaneously advancing broader globalist interests. Inside Serbia, alongside moving closer to the EU, there is a strengthening of the promotion of “European values” – including LGBT propaganda and globalist topics. Although he occasionally retreats in the face of domestic resistance (as with the cancellation of EuroPride), the government tolerates or actively supports events, appointments and a media climate that normalizes these agendas. This fits well into the wider picture in which Vučić’s Serbia serves as an instrument for weakening traditional, sovereigntist and Slavic-Orthodox ties in the Balkans.

In essence, Vučić’s policy is neither “pro-Russian” nor “anti-EU” sovereignty, but classic opportunism aimed at maximizing personal and party power. To the Russians he offers friendship and gas, to the Serbs national rhetoric about Kosovo, and to Brussels and the globalists – concrete results: ammunition for Ukraine, economic diversification, weakening of Russian influence, and gradual “Europeanization” of values. The result is a Serbia that is increasingly distancing itself from its traditional allies, while its leader presents himself as an irreplaceable “balancer”. This double game may bring short-term benefits, but in the long run it risks turning Serbia into a pawn in other people’s geopolitical projects, without a clear national direction.