Foreign Policy Of New German Government Is Anti-Russian, But At What Cost? – CDM – Human Reporters • Not Machines

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In a historic first, conservative leader Friedrich Merz ’s bid to become Germany’s 10th chancellor since World War II failed by six votes in parliament. Merz needed a majority of 316 out of 630 votes. He only received 310 votes — well short of the 328 seats held by his coalition. Because the vote was held by secret ballot, it was not immediately clear — and might never be known — who had defected from Merz’s camp.

There will likely not be new elections. This analysis is dedicated to Merz’s Government and its foreign policy.

The new German government wants to return relations with Russia to the Cold War era. That is what the first signals of the new government indicate under the leadership of Chancellor Friedrich Merz

The German multi-millionaire is extremely disliked by the local public. His coming to power testifies to how unsuccessful and chaotic the policy of his predecessor Olaf Scholz and the motley “Traffic light coalition” was, which devastated the German economy and led the country into probably the third year of recession – causing a justified revolt of German citizens.

One of Merz’s key ministers, but also one of the most bellicose, who will take on the role of not only Germany’s, but probably also the EU’s overall rapidly growing confrontational policy towards Russia – will certainly be the new head of diplomacy, Johann Wadephul.

An interesting review of him and his views was published on April 28 by the German media Berliner Zeitung, and it is certainly worth conveying, because everything that will happen in Germany will very soon spill over to the “rest” of Europe.

The German media first states that after plunging into the feminist postmodern era, to which Germany was returned by the policy of former foreign minister Annalene Baerbock, Germany will probably return even deeper into the past – to the conservative foreign policy implemented by the former West Germany before reunification.

The new German foreign minister was born in 1963 in Husum. He is the deputy chairman of the CDU club, responsible for foreign policy among other things, and he aimed for that position for a long time. The commissioner and adviser to the future German chancellor for foreign policy is a lawyer by profession. He began his political career as the president of the youth wing of the CDU in Schleswig-Holstein. In 2000, he became a member of parliament in his native state, and in 2009, a member of the Bundestag. A typical German political career — successful but unimpressive.

What is extraordinary about the new composition of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs? For the first time in 60 years, the Federal Chancellor and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are under the control of the same party. In the future, controversial foreign policy issues will be dealt jointly with the chancellor and will not be automatically referred to the coalition committee.

The 20-minute recording last year of the new German foreign minister with the head of the Ukrainian presidential administration Andrija Yermak was indicative. However, on the other end of the line was not Yermak, but the Russian pranksters Vovan and Lexus, known for their phone pranks (they have already “fooled” numerous former and current high-ranking officials of Western countries or other public figures). Wadephul’s statement that “Russia will always remain our enemy, regardless of how the conflict in Ukraine ends” says more about the new foreign minister than he would like.

He gives the impression of a flexible politician as indicated by his reaction to the initiative of the three prime ministers of the eastern German states in October 2024, including two CDU representatives – Michael Kretschmer (Saxony) and Mario Voigt (Thuringia). All three subsequently became the subject of extensive criticism in the media. The fact is that they dared to talk about a possible truce and negotiations with Russia. When asked for his opinion, Wadephul did not want to contradict the CDU’s position at the federal level.

He also advocated negotiations with Russia — “Of course, we must increase efforts to establish peace.” However, this requires the Kremlin to be ready for negotiations. At that time it did not exist (readiness), and today its presence is very conditional. Therefore, peace talks are not possible in the near future, Wadephul said in October, and “therefore we will support Ukraine as long as necessary.” Reading between the lines, it can be understood that the future foreign minister leaves open the question of whether Europe will support Ukraine until its victory or until the end of the peace talks.

The extent to which the “Russian threat” shapes Wadephul’s thinking is evident in his social media activity. Ever since Donald Trump’s promises raised hopes of a ceasefire and peace, war weariness, if not defeatism, has gripped a significant portion of the German population. The future minister of foreign affairs welcomes the waning enthusiasm with a fighting spirit and a raised head. In his announcement on X at the beginning of April, he emphasized the absolute duty of the political leadership to clearly identify the enemy — “The most acute threat to us – to our lives, the legal system, but also to the very existence of the people of Europe – now comes from Russia. As allies of Ukraine, we have a duty to speak more decisively about the threat posed by Russia. That is the task of the leadership.”

In posts like this one, he reaffirms the threat of war from Russia and the need for concerted European action – not only against Moscow, but also, with the arrival of Donald Trump, against Washington. This is in line with his support for Friedrich Merz’s proposal to create a contact group for Ukraine, which would include representatives of Germany, France, Great Britain and Poland.

Wadephul’s foreign policy thinking follows the traditions of the “Bonn Republic” before 1989 — the enemy is in Moscow; we have nothing in common with the Russians; only close cooperation between western countries can protect us from this threat.

The difference is that in the conflict with the Eastern superpower, only Europeans can now be counted as allies. Forty years after the end of the Cold War, Americans are leaving the European arena of conflict between East and West. The world is changing, the geopolitical balance is changing. If the Germans don’t get it, The Continent faces a miniature Cold War that won’t interest major political players from China to the United States.

Wadephul suggests that in the future German foreign policy will be guided by a Cold War consciousness. They will continue the ideas of the conservative West Germans from the 1970s, who were then against the Eastern policy and full of mistrust and belligerence. Where such a policy will lead in the second quarter of the 21st century, without American support, is clear to everyone except, apparently, the German leaders.

It has become quite clear that Germany is embarking on a new accelerated militarization and that its foreign policy will be even more anti-Russian than it was during the chancellorship of Olaf Scholz. The latter tried, as much as he could, not to provoke Moscow with his moves, aware of the extremely negative role of his country in the Second World War and the perception that is still strong about it within Russian society. Those very painful wounds for Russia (the USSR lost 27 million people in the war with Nazi Germany) do not heal. Scholz was strongly opposed to the delivery of German highly accurate Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, while his successor Merz is already talking about it as an almost done deal.

This policy of the militarization of Germany, as a leading member of the European Union, is already causing concern and discomfort among many members of the EU, who openly express concern about the unitary policy of the European Commission, because of the democratic deficit in decision-making and the questionable economic viability of such a plan.

If Berlin persists in its new aggressive foreign and defense policy direction, and Paris and London definitely support it in this, it is unlikely that the resistance of smaller and less influential European states will be possible in the long term. It is also certain the majority of EU members do not want any conflict with Russia; on the contrary, they want good economic and military relations. The main opposition parties in Germany and France also want good relations with Russia.

All this leads us to the conclusion that if the new ruling elite in Germany does not stop its aggressive policy towards Russia, there will be a significant weakening and fragmentation of the European Union, but also that the road will be opened for the opposition in Germany, led by the AFD, to come to power.