A year after Hamas attack, more continuity than change for the Palestinians and Israel

The rapid pace of unfolding events between Israel and the Palestinians, and more broadly in the Middle East, can make people think change is inevitable.

Political scientists like me sometimes see significant and disruptive events, such as the Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, and their aftermath as drivers of heightened uncertainty with the potential to drive broader change.

But in the year since then, not much has changed.

Relatively stable status quo on Oct. 6

Throughout the early part of 2023, the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians and the broader region seemed generally stable. In September 2023, U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan declared that the Middle East was “quieter than it has been in two decades.”

The Palestinians widely believed that their representatives – the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and Hamas in the Gaza Strip – were corrupt and deserved little or no public trust. At the same time, Palestinian factionalism and the divide between the West Bank and Gaza was unbridgeable.

Israeli society had experienced nine months of popular demonstrations against conservative government reforms, including proposed limits on judicial power. In fact, elements of Israeli democracy, including its laws and liberal values, had been weakening for many years.

Israel’s relations with the Palestinians were stable, if tense. Israel exercised military control over the Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank.

Israel’s approach to managing its conflict with the Palestinians relied on surveillance technology and intelligence-gathering to provide border security with Gaza. Periodic military operations were believed to be deterring Hamas from open violence. So were economic incentives, such as millions of dollars in cash given to Hamas through Qatar and work permits for Gaza residents to enter Israel.

The government of Israel’s approach was intended to break the ties between Gaza and the West Bank, with the aim of weakening the Palestinian Authority. The ultimate objective was to prevent the reemergence of political negotiations around the prospect of Palestinian statehood.

In the U.S., the Biden administration had focused its attention abroad primarily on China. What attention it was paying to the Middle East largely involved a defense pact with Saudi Arabia that would have included restoring diplomatic relations between the Saudis and Israel, with little to no attention to the Palestinian issue.

For other key countries in the Middle East, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, less focus on the Palestinian issue was also convenient. Their national security goals of countering rising Iranian power aligned with those of Israel.

Iran, too, had been interested in maintaining the status quo. It had been seeking to restore ties with various Arab governments and to get some relief from economic sanctions. Some relief came as part of the August 2023 prisoner exchange with the U.S.

A prospect of change

Pundits and analysts saw the Oct. 7 attack and the ensuing Israel bombing campaign and then ground invasion of Gaza as creating an opportunity for change.

Among observers, a consensus emerged that the Hamas attack had made clear that Palestinian demands for self-determination were not going to quietly disappear.

Suggestions for action included resuming political negotiations for a Palestinian state, reforming the Palestinian Authority to restore its legitimacy, and getting neighboring countries involved in securing and rebuilding Gaza in exchange for improved diplomatic relations with Israel.

Calls for change came from across the world community, with public demonstrations worldwide. And international legal institutions called for peace and calm: The International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court opened inquiries into actions of both Hamas and Israel.

Little change a year later

A year later, little of what people imagined could happen has happened.

The Palestinian Authority focuses on its own survival amid growing instability in the West Bank, including violence from Israeli settlers, operations by the Israeli military and resistance by Palestinian militants.

In Gaza, humanitarian conditions are dire, including acute levels of hunger, water scarcity and poor sanitary conditions. Some fighting continues, while Hamas attempts to regroup where feasible.

In Israel, as the war against Hamas continued, so has the process of Israel’s democratic backsliding, marked with limitations on free speech and more widespread nationalist hawkish sentiment. Despite persistent protests and calls for resignations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s pro-war coalition survives and is likely to survive until the planned October 2026 elections.

The Israeli governing coalition’s statements and actions indicate it intends to avoid conflict resolution by expanding Israeli settlements in the West Bank and extending security buffer zones under Israeli military control within Lebanon and Gaza.

The U.S. was active, with Secretary of State Antony Blinken visiting the region nine times, and President Joe Biden officially embracing negotiations for a cease-fire and a hostage deal in the short term, and regional negotiations in the long term. After one cease-fire and the release of more than 100 hostages, none of these efforts produced further cessation of war or hostage releases.

As the fall election approaches, it is unclear which of the United States’ efforts will continue. Most of the American public – 62% – wants the U.S. to play a minor role, or no role at all, in resolving the Israel-Hamas war.

Wider interests prevail

Other Middle Eastern nations publicly support and often participate in U.S.-led negotiations, but they are all careful to maintain their own interests.

For instance, Egypt and Jordan are concerned about the potential for more Palestinians to flee the fighting and come to their territories. The Saudis and the United Arab Emirates worry that the conflict could spill over into other countries.

Iran’s position has strengthened somewhat, with an increase in power and attention to its proxies, including Hamas, Hezbollah, the Assad regime in Syria, Shiite militias in both Iraq and Syria, and the Houthis in Yemen.

Until the Oct. 1, 2024, missile attacks on Israel, Iran had consistently signaled that its main interest was to avoid a regional war. Its new president, Masoud Pezeshkian, has repeatedly spoken of his desire for a constructive dialogue with the West.

Overall, in spite of nearly a year of fighting and the loss of so many lives, there is more continuity than change. International courts take their time and have limited power. Israel’s democratic backsliding, its 57-year occupation of the Palestinian territories, Palestinian fragmentation and weak governance, and the lack of real commitment by nearby countries and the U.S. continue – and so does the lack of any stable or peaceful resolution.