Beyond Monarchs And Mullahs: Inside The Democratic Vision Powering Iran’s Uprising – JP
Please Follow us on Gab, Minds, Telegram, Rumble, Truth Social, Gettr, Twitter, Youtube
As of August 2025, resistance to the rule of Iran’s clerical regime is intensifying across multiple sectors, with recurrent protests over economic hardship, systemic corruption, and state violence uniting a broad coalition of workers, retirees, youth, and political dissidents[1][3].
On August 3, 2025, widespread protests erupted in cities including Tehran, Sanandaj, Isfahan, and Nurabad Mamasani. Demonstrators ranged from unpaid municipal workers in Sanandaj—who have not received salaries for five months—to retired steel and mine workers in Isfahan demanding lawful pension payments and an end to economic mismanagement[1]. Economic grievances are compounded by deepening poverty and failures in essential services, symbolizing a growing crisis of state legitimacy[1][3]. In Tehran, protests extended to electricity operators and bakers, whose livelihoods are threatened by corruption, blackouts, and shortages[3].
Public outrage is also fueled by state violence. On July 1, 2025, Basij forces fatally shot two young men in Hamedan, sparking mass protests during their funeral on July 3. Crowds condemned the regime with chants such as “Death to the oppressor” and “Our enemy is right here; they lie when they say it’s America,” despite the risk of repression[2]. According to Maryam Rajavi of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), escalating executions and violent crackdowns are increasing popular determination for regime change[2].
Protesters in support of MEK in Sweden
International activism is amplifying these demands. On August 2, 2025, MEK (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran, PMOI) supporters in Gothenburg, Sweden, rallied to condemn the recent executions of political prisoners and to urge official recognition of the NCRI as a democratic alternative to the current government[4]. Such protests, echoed across the Iranian diaspora, advocate for justice, human rights, and blacklisting of the regime’s repressive institutions[4]. Overall, Iran’s resistance now manifests as a sustained, multi-front mobilization against the clerical regime’s political and economic failures, marked by both grassroots action inside the country and coordinated advocacy abroad.
The Modern Iranian Resistance: MEK’s Strategy and the Evolution of the Struggle Against the Regime
The Iranian struggle for freedom from theocratic rule is entering a sophisticated new era, shaped by decades of experience and a continuing evolution in the methods of both resistance and repression. Insights gathered from a recent meeting with MEK (People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran) representatives from Ashraf 3 in Albania—now home to much of Iran’s organized opposition-in-exile—highlight both the resilience of underground activist networks inside Iran and the political roadmap being prepared in anticipation of transformative change.
**Evolution of Resistance: Decentralized, Resilient, and Cyber-Savvy**
According to MEK officials, unlike the large, centrally-coordinated opposition structures of the 1980s—when tens of thousands of activists and entire families were traced, imprisoned, and often executed through a brutal system of torture and forced collaboration—the modern resistance operates as decentralized, independent “cells” [4]. This adaptation has made the regime’s longstanding tactics of infiltrating, suppressing, and dismantling dissident networks far less effective. Where once mass roundups enabled horrific massacres (the MEK claims over 120,000 supporters have been killed since 1981, as dramatically documented at the Ashraf 3 museum), today each MEK cell is small, secretive, and disconnected from others, making widespread repression exceedingly difficult.
MEK Museum Ashraf 3 photo by Douglas Ross
These cells regularly conduct spontaneous protests, sabotage, and—especially symbolically—display banners of Maryam Rajavi, the NCRI’s president-elect, a gesture of defiance and hope. The resilience of these networks is fortified by advances on the “cyberfront,” as activists use secure communications to bypass regime censorship and keep international lines of truth open, despite unrelenting attempts by Iranian authorities to isolate the population[8]. Although the communication from Ashraf 3 following the regime-inspired crackdown of 2023 by Albanian police[10] may be limited, we believe that the dispersed leadership of the MEK/NCRI can effectively communicate and inspire their dedicated freedom-loving brethren inside of Iran.
**A Provisional Government and a Constitution Ready for a Free Iran**
MEK and its political umbrella, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), maintain that they have a provisional government structure, a full cabinet, and a ten-point constitutional plan ready to be enacted the day the regime falls. Central planks include gender equality, complete democracy, and absolute religious freedom—values notably absent in today’s theocratic state. They vow to hold free elections within six months, marking a clear break with both the clerical autocracy and the possibility of monarchist restoration.
Crown Prince Pahlavi, courtesy of Wikimedia Commons
**Rejection of Monarchy and Authoritarian Alternatives**
The idea, currently floated in some diaspora and foreign circles, that exiled royalty might return to power is dismissed outright by MEK activists, who view suggestions of a Pahlavi restoration as regime-based disinformation meant to distract or divide the opposition[6][ 7][ 8]. The resistance insists that Iranians have no desire to “bring back the dinosaurs out of Jurassic Park”—a phrase MEK representatives use to underscore the incompatibility of monarchy with popular aspirations for a modern democracy. Recent months have seen a significant intensification in the public activities and international profile of Reza Pahlavi, the exiled Crown Prince and son of Iran’s last Shah, as he positions himself and his political roadmap for a potential post-regime transition in Iran.
According to June and July 2025 reporting, Pahlavi has made a series of high-profile statements and press appearances in which he declares his readiness to help lead Iran through a transitional period if the Islamic Republic collapses. In a June press conference, Pahlavi announced he is prepared to take on a guiding role and laid out the existence of a detailed “100-day transition plan” crafted alongside advisors and experts[12][ 13]. He emphasized that this plan includes provisions for civilian governance, broad-based participation, and respects the will of the Iranian people—whether they ultimately favor a republic or constitutional monarchy[11][13].
Pahlavi also claims substantial insider support, reporting that tens of thousands, including some 50,000 regime insiders, have contacted his offices supporting nonviolent regime change and signaling readiness to join a transitional coalition, should the opportunity arise[15]. His message is increasingly directed not only at the public but also at members of the Iranian security forces, urging military, police, and state employees to help ensure a peaceful, lawful handover[13][ 15].
Internationally, Pahlavi has built close contacts with Western officials and has aligned some of his outreach with Israeli and US strategic priorities regarding Iran, most notably in his opposition to current nuclear negotiations and in his call for the “Cyrus Accords” to foster renewed ties between Iran and Israel[14]. While he insists his aim is a national referendum to determine Iran’s future system, some opposition groups and analysts view his campaign as part of a broader effort to rehabilitate the Pahlavi monarchy and position himself as a unique successor, something critics claim is far more popular abroad than among Iranians inside the country[14].
Still, Pahlavi’s prominence on the international stage and concrete transitional planning make him a key—if polarizing—figure in the debate over Iran’s political future. With the opposition landscape highly fragmented, factions supporting the MEK/NCRI remain deeply skeptical of any return to monarchical rule, and both camps actively court international public opinion, each arguing that they offer the most viable path to a democratic Iran[13][14][15]. MEK sources remind us of the fact that the Pahlavis left IRAN with a purported $80B of the Iranians’ money as they fled the revolution, and that money is now fueling the Crown princes’ bid to return as Shah. They also point out that there is a likely connection between Pahlavi, the IRGC(the mullahs’ secret police that replaced the Shah’s SAVAK), and global elites, including Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, who may not want to see a fully democratic Iran. MEK sources say that the 50,000 supporters Pahlavi mentions are the same elements that have imprisoned, tortured, and executed tens of thousands of democracy supporters.
Florida Governor Ron DeSantis with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu courtesy Wikimedia Commons
**Unwavering Commitment to Non-Violence and Political Solutions**
Contrary to regime propaganda, which seeks to paint the MEK as militant or terrorist, its current strategy is explicitly nonviolent [6][ 7]. MEK leaders emphasize that, following the 2003 disarmament overseen by US and Iraqi authorities, their organization voluntarily relinquished all military means and is now exclusively a political and civil resistance movement[5][ 6]. The widespread brutality, they say, is wielded entirely by the IRGC and clerical regime, not the opposition. MEK and NCRI leaders are clear: their goal is neither Western military intervention nor any violent insurrection, but instead international political and diplomatic support—including stronger sanctions and embargoes to further isolate the regime—and global recognition of the NCRI as the legitimate democratic alternative[6][7][8].
**An International Call: Standing with Iran’s Democratic Resistance**
Recent rallies in cities such as Gothenburg, Sweden, have gathered widespread diaspora support, underscoring an international consensus against both clerical and monarchic authoritarianism[6][ 7]. These demonstrations explicitly back Maryam Rajavi’s “Third Option”—an Iranian-led democratic transition—and demand that global powers end their policies of appeasement, sanction the IRGC, and close regime embassies that function as intelligence outposts. Participants also urge the international community to confront pro-regime disinformation in the global media sphere, especially as powerful interests seek to preserve ties to the current tyranny for economic or geopolitical gain.
**Context: The Human Cost and the Forward Path**
According to MEK sources, the regime, facing unprecedented domestic unrest and growing international scrutiny after high-profile executions and the harsh suppression of demonstrations, increasingly relies on mass violence and fear[7][ 8]. Yet the momentum—fueled by underground activism, digital organization, and determined nonviolent resistance—suggests the Iranian people are more prepared than ever for self-determination and a democratic future. The MEK’s message is clear: the path to freedom will be made not with “military or violent support” from abroad, but with the world’s recognition, diplomatic engagement, and targeted sanctions that cut off the regime’s lifelines[6][7][8]. The movement, steeled by decades of sacrifice and sustained by the discipline of underground organizing, stands ready—provisionally and with a vision for justice, pluralism, and peace—should the opportunity for democratic transition at last arrive. For those inside and outside Iran, exploring the Ashraf 3 online museum offers powerful testimony to the movement’s endurance and to the long arc of resistance that, after so much loss, may be nearing a decisive juncture.
**A Regime Perspective: The MEK Threat—Foreign Meddling and Manufactured Unrest**
Ayatolla Khamenei, courtesy of Wikimedia
From the viewpoint of Iran’s current leadership and regime-aligned media, the challenges facing the Islamic Republic are less about widespread dissatisfaction and more about an orchestrated campaign of destabilization led by foreign powers and terrorist groups—most notably the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).
Officials in Tehran, responding to events like the “Free Iran 2025” summit in Rome, have issued urgent communiqués condemning the MEK and its international backers. “A danger lurks as the revolutionary nation of Iran stands on the threshold of national unity… this terrorist group once again sharpened its sword in Rome with the backing of global arrogance to target the sacred Islamic Republic,” declared *Hamiyan-e-Velayat*, a prominent pro-regime outlet[16]. In this narrative, the MEK is presented as merely a tool of adversaries such as the United States, Israel, and remnants of Saddam Hussein’s regime—actors accused of exploiting unrest to undermine Iranian sovereignty and Islamic values[16].
The regime argues that the MEK’s activities are neither organic nor popular. Instead, officials allege that the group uses sophisticated psychological tactics on social media to deceive Iranian youth, employing viral content and fake opportunities to lure in unsuspecting citizens before revealing their political intent[16]. This approach, they assert, is intended to manufacture the appearance of grassroots dissent when, in reality, the MEK’s true footing inside Iran is marginal.
Moreover, pro-Khamenei voices emphasize the MEK’s violent legacy. The history of attacks on Iranian targets, cooperation with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War, and opposition to both the Shah and post-revolutionary government are cited as evidence that the group’s claims of democratic aims are hollow and self-serving[17][ 18]. Unrest, in this interpretation, is not the result of a failed state but the consequence of foreign-inspired sabotage and opportunism by banned groups.
Finally, the regime frames its actions not as repression, but as defense against subversion and terrorism. Crackdowns are portrayed as necessary to preserve public order and protect the gains of the 1979 Revolution, with media dismissing allegations of popular support for the MEK as foreign propaganda.
In summary, the Khamenei regime’s response to the current wave of opposition highlights its conviction that the MEK and similar groups are the instruments of hostile foreign powers, not the authentic voice of Iranians. According to this viewpoint, the Islamic Republic remains legitimate and resilient, and opposition will be met with a robust defense of national unity and revolutionary values[16][17][18].
Current circumstances make it exceptionally difficult to obtain direct news from inside Iran or to travel there, due to both Iranian government restrictions and heightened international travel advisories. This being said, the information war appears to have already been won by the opposition as even the information about what the theocratic regime is saying is being filtered by the PMOI/MEK. We leave it to the reader to decide where the truth lies.
[1][2][3][4[5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18]